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Jefferson Davis: Winning Speeches while Losing a War
In A War of Words, R. Jarrod Atchison, an associate professor in the
Communications Department at Wake Forest University, examines the rhetorical
leadership of Jefferson Davis. Specifically, he analyzes how Davis’s rhetoric
evolved over the course of five speeches: his January 1861 resignation from the
senate, his February 1861 inauguration as Confederate president, his speech
before the Mississippi legislature in December 1862, his January 1863 address to
Congress in reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation, and his November 1864
call for slaves to serve in the Confederate army. According to Atchison, Davis
successfully used these speeches to achieve short-term political goals, but in the
long run his words failed to define the ideology of the Confederacy. He
succinctly concludes that Davis “struggled in his role as rhetorical leader for the
Confederacy.” (92)
The speeches serve as an excellent example of how Davis’s political view
changed over time. When he left the senate, Davis used rhetoric to frame
secession as an accomplished fact. Atchison explains how, unlike his southern
colleagues who used their bombastic resignation speeches to attack the United
States, the Mississippi senator skillfully employed both decorum and timing (in
the
jargon
of
rhetorical
analysis
this
included
both
to
prepon—appropriateness—and kairos—an opportune moment) to explain why
secession should reduce tensions between the North and the South. At his
inauguration a month later, Davis would articulate a Confederate ideology based
on civic republicanism and a commitment to states’ rights.
The war forced Davis to change the meaning of the Confederacy. Simply
put, a nation of republican farmers committed to states’ rights could not wage a
successful war against a superior power. By the end of 1862, Davis would
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employ amplification to portray the Union as barbarians trying to subjugate the
South. Thus, to defeat these invaders, the Confederacy had to convert itself into a
nation of virtuous warriors willing to sacrifice ideals including states’ rights for
nationalistic measures such as conscription. The 1863 Emancipation
Proclamation only solidified this stance as it demonstrated that Lincoln’s
previous denials of abolitionism were lies, thereby proving the Republican
abolitionist conspiracy that Fire Eaters had long alleged. Ironically, given this
commitment to the defense of slavery, Davis would, at the end of the following
year, call for the arming of slaves, urging Confederates to sacrifice slavery for
their independence.
Davis’s themes changed dramatically over the four years of the war, and
Atchison contends that the president did not do enough to prepare southerners
for these transformations. Atchison charges the president with “overlooking the
long-term rhetorical work necessary to sustain a sense of Confederate
nationalism in favor of short-term political gains.” (2) A gifted orator, Davis
rallied southerners behind his particular plans, but he did not create a long-term
loyalty to the Confederacy.
Atchison credits his interest in the Civil War history to his days as an
undergraduate student in Paul Escott’s class. Apparently, Atchison took notes
very well. His analysis of Davis’s failure to create a Confederate nationalism
dovetails with his mentor’s conclusions in After Secession: Jefferson Davis and
the Failure of Confederate Nationalism. In doing so, however, Atchison never
acknowledges the opposing side of this historiographic debate, which would
contend that Davis did an impressive job in keeping the Confederacy afloat for
four years and in transforming states’rights imbued southerners into
Confederates willing to sacrifice over 260,000 lives in a failed bid for their
independence.
To put it another way, Atchison does not always carefully separate cause
and effect. Did Davis’s speeches fail to create Confederate nationalism and
contribute to its defeat? Or, instead of lacking will, did the Confederacy lose will
in the wake of military reverses? And if the answer is to this latter question is
“yes,” then is it possible that Davis’s stirring speeches lengthened rather than
shortened the Confederacy’s life? While historians will never achieve consensus
on these answers, Atchison could have done more to buttress his side of the
argument. First, he could have offered some thoughts as to what Davis should
have done in these speeches to create a viable Confederate nationalism. Second,
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he could have analyzed more speeches or writings. A War of Words looks at two
speeches within a month in 1861, another two within a month in 1862-3, and a
final one in November of 1864. This arrangement leaves two separate 22-month
gaps: February 1861 to December 1862 and January 1863 to November 1864.
During these periods, Davis delivered other speeches and messages to Congress
that would help demonstrate the evolution of his rhetoric. Third, to help prove
his case, the book would have benefitted from a greater discussion of the
reactions to Davis’s speeches. At times, there is a brief discussion of newspaper
coverage, but not enough to provide the reader with a sense of the speeches’
impact on popular opinion (recognizing that popular opinion is impossible to
gauge in the nineteenth century).
Despite these misgivings, A War of Words is to be commended on several
fronts. First, it takes the language of political speeches seriously. Too often, this
rhetoric is ignored in studies of the Civil War. The words of political leaders
mattered, and Atchison’s work reminds us to give them the consideration they
deserve. Second, he stresses the evolution of rhetoric over time. Often scholars
posit nationalism as static entity—either it existed or it did not. In contrast,
Atchison uses Davis’s speeches to show that Confederate nationalism of 1861
did not equate to Confederate nationalism of 1865. Third, the author manages to
accomplish these goals in a very brief and readable book (fewer than 100 pages
of text). The fact that the reader will wish for additional pages is more of a
positive than a negative. Overall, if you study Civil War Era politics, A War of
Words deserves a place on your bookshelf.
John M. Sacher is an Associate Professor of History at the University of
Central Florida. He is the author of A Perfect War of Politics: Parties,
Politicians, and Democracy in Louisiana, 1824-1861. He is currently working on
a book on conscription in the Confederacy
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